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Abstract  
 
FIDUCIA (New European Crimes and Trust-based Policy) seeks to shed light on a number of 
distinctively ‘new European’ criminal behaviours which have emerged in the last decade as 
a consequence of both technology developments and the increased mobility of populations 
across Europe. A key objective of FIDUCIA is to propose and proof a ‘trust-based’ policy 
model in relation to emerging forms of criminality – to explore the idea that public trust and 
institutional legitimacy are important for the social regulation of the trafficking of human 
beings, the trafficking of goods, the criminalisation of migration and ethnic minorities, and 
cybercrimes. In this paper we detail levels of trust and legitimacy in the 26 countries, 
drawing on data from Round 5 of the European Social Survey. We conduct a sensitivity 
analysis that investigates the effect of a lack of measurement equivalence on national 
estimates. 
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FIDUCIA 
NEW EUROPEAN CRIMES 
AND TRUST-BASED POLICY 
 
 
FIDUCIA (New European Crimes and Trust-based Policy) seeks to shed light on a number of 
distinctively ‘new European’ criminal behaviours which have emerged in the last decade as a 
consequence of both technology developments and the increased mobility of populations across 
Europe. A key objective of FIDUCIA is to propose and proof a ‘trust-based’ policy model in relation 
to emerging forms of criminality – to explore the idea that public trust and institutional legitimacy 
are important for the social regulation of the trafficking of human beings, the trafficking of goods, 
the criminalisation of migration and ethnic minorities, and cybercrimes.  
 
Work Package 11 draws on European Social Survey (ESS) Round 5 data to assess the importance of 
trust and legitimacy in the context of ‘everyday crimes’ such as buying stolen goods. This 
overarching goal breaks down into three tasks. The first is descriptive – to document levels of trust 
and legitimacy across 27 countries (most of which are in the European Union). The second task is 
analytical – to explain individual and national variation in trust and legitimacy. The third task, also 
analytical, tests models of instrumental and normative compliance (Tyler, 2006a, 2006b, 2011a 
2011b; Hough et al., 2013a, 2013b; Bradford et al., 2013a, 2013b). These tasks are contained in 
WP11.1, 11.2 and 11.3 respectively.  
 
Deliverable 11.1, which summarises the work produced under WP11.1, is organised into five 
sections: 
 
1. The introduction sets out the policy context of the work; 
2. A conceptual roadmap elaborates the meaning of trust and legitimacy in the context of 
comparative public attitudes towards legal authority; 
3. The first empirical section details levels of trust and legitimacy in the 26 countries using a 
single indicator for each construct (i.e. answers to one survey question for each dimension 
of trust and legitimacy); 
4. The second empirical section presents levels of trust and legitimacy in the 26 countries 
using scales for certain relevant constructs. This involves conducting a sensitivity analysis 
that investigates the effect of a lack of measurement equivalence on national estimates; and, 
5. The final section summarises the deliverable and provides a roadmap for the other 
deliverables in Work Package 11. 
~ 
SP1 - COOPERATION 
SSH.2011.3.2-1 
GRANT AGREEMENT NR 290653 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Concepts of trust and legitimacy speak to a number of important moral and practical connections 
between citizens and social systems. Individuals in a democratic society have the right and 
expectation to live under a system that operates within the rule of law, that acts effectively and 
fairly within commonly accepted norms, that demonstrates to itself and to citizens its rightful 
possession of power.  
 
Trust and institutional legitimacy also help to sustain social and political institutions and 
arrangements. For institutions to flourish, they need to demonstrate to citizens that they are 
trustworthy and that they possess the authority to govern. In turn, legitimacy encourages public 
compliance with the law and cooperation with legal authorities, facilitating the function of justice 
institutions (Tyler, 2006a, 2006b, 2011a; Tyler & Jackson, 2013).  
 
In this deliverable we outline the conceptual and methodological roadmap for a comparative 
analysis of trust in justice and the legitimacy of legal authorities. Do Europeans believe that their 
police and criminal courts are trustworthy? Do Europeans believe that the police and criminal 
courts hold legitimate power and influence? The indicators we present were developed by 
European Commission Seventh Framework Programme funded EURO-JUSTIS project 
(www.eurojustis.eu) and subsequently fielded in Round 5 of the European Social Survey (ESS). In 
this document we first present the theory and describe the methodological development process of 
the 45-item ESS module, which provides data on public perceptions of the police and courts in 26 
countries.  
 
We then document levels of trust and legitimacy across Europe (and beyond). Some of the concepts 
were measured using a single indicator (given pressure of space in the ESS module), while other 
concepts were measured using multiple indicators (see also European Social Survey, 2012; Hough 
et al., 2013a, 2013b, 2013c). In the context of cross-national research, however, multiple indicators 
present an interesting challenge: namely, does the scale operate in comparable ways across 
different contexts?  
 
In WP11.1 we present findings from single indicators, documenting country variation in trust and 
legitimacy. We also present an innovative new way of assessing and utilising the scales, involving 
sensitivity analysis of a particular sort. We estimate latent means/proportions under the 
assumption of measurement equivalence; we free up each individual indicator in the scale and 
estimate latent means/proportions; and we present these graphically to assess the extent to which 
estimates ‘move around’, i.e. whether national estimates shift when one allows the scales to operate 
differently in different contexts. The next step in this new and innovative methodological approach 
is to do some sort of model averaging, where a weighted mean/summary is taken from the various 
estimates, giving the measurement models with greater fit more weight (this analysis is underway 
and is not presented in this document). 
 
WP11.1 presents social indicators of public trust and institutional legitimacy. Economic indicators 
are widely used to trace economic development and predict future economic performance, and 
while the social, cultural or educational provision in a nation depends critically on its economic 
condition, economic indicators do not tell us everything about a country’s overall social condition. 
Combining national information with transnational objectives, social indicators provide 
measurements of human well-being and societal functioning, allowing us to monitor the broader 
system, identify change, and guide efforts to improve policy and conditions in areas such as health 
(e.g. life expectancy rates), crime (e.g. recorded crime figures) and education (e.g. school enrolment 
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rates). When taking the measure of a nation it is particularly important to assess how citizens view 
the way in which their societies operate. As Jowell & Eva (2009: 318) ask: ‘Do they, for instance see 
their societies as generally fair or unfair? Do their country’s institutions inspire trust or suspicion? 
Is their system of criminal justice seen to be even-handed or biased? Do their neighbourhoods feel 
safe or dangerous?’  
 
What constitutes human well-being is, of course, a normative and political question. But once some 
level of consensus is reached, social indicators can help policy-makers understand the shifting 
circumstances of life in different countries. Social indicators of trust and legitimacy are based on the 
idea that European Member States need to pay closer attention to these issues if they are to achieve 
balanced and effective crime policies (Schulhofer et al., 2011; Hough, 2013).  
 
Social indicators of trust in justice (and legitimacy) are vital for better formulation of the problems 
facing criminal justice agencies, as well as more effective monitoring of changes in public attitudes 
in response to policy innovation (Jackson et al., 2011). An emphasis on public trust and institutional 
legitimacy can be contrasted with more short-term and ‘populist’ policies, which exploit public 
feelings for political gain at the expense of ensuring that the justice system commands legitimacy 
and that citizens feel safe and secure (Tyler, 2006a, 2006b).  
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2. CONCEPTUAL ROADMAP 
Section 2 outlines what we mean by trust in justice and the legitimacy of legal authorities. A useful 
distinction can be made between legitimacy and trust. Legitimacy is a belief in the moral right of 
legal authorities to possess and exercise power and influence, while trust is a belief in how 
individual actors working for the institution perform their roles (Jackson & Bradford, 2010; Tyler & 
Jackson, 2013). In the words of Hawdon (2008: 186): “The role is legitimate; the individual is 
trusted.”  
 
Measures of trust should focus on the intentions and capabilities of specific actors, e.g. whether the 
individuals or organizations can be trusted to fulfil specific institutional functions, like being 
effective, fair, dependable and have appropriate priorities. By contrast, measures of legitimacy 
should focus on judgements of the right to power, to prescribe behaviour, and enforce laws that 
emanate from the role and institution. They should address the authority that the institution and 
role confers onto individual police officers and, conversely, the specific moral validity that actions 
of individuals confer back to the institution and role.2 
 
Trust in justice 
To trust in the police and the criminal courts is to assume that criminal justice agencies and agents 
are willing and able to do what they are tasked to do (Jackson et al., 2012a, 2012b). Spanning both 
intentions and abilities, trust is the belief that individuals working for criminal justice institutions 
have appropriate shared motivations and are able to fulfil their roles competently (cf. Hardin, 
2002).  
 
It is important to consider the roles that justice systems perform. On the one hand, criminal justice 
agencies are public services. Citizens look to them to respond to emergencies, to prevent crimes, to 
deal with criminals, to punish law-breakers, and so forth. Accordingly, trust in the effectiveness of 
an institution is focused on outcomes (rather than the efficiency of an institution, although an 
inefficient police force and inefficient court systems might be bad at providing services). To believe 
that the police are effective is to believe, for example, that one can rely upon police officers to be 
‘out there’ performing their functions. It is also to believe that one can rely on police officers if one 
in the future were to need the police (to respond to an emergency, for instance). 
 
On the other hand, criminal justice agencies are state-sponsored agents of violence and intrusion. 
To trust justice institutions thus implies that we believe that they use – and will use – their power 
wisely and fairly. We look to police officers not only to apprehend those who disobey the law, for 
example, but also to be impartial, fair and restrained in their use of authority. Trust in distributive 
justice refers to fairness of the ‘goods’ that the police and criminal courts distribute. Are the 
outcomes of justice distributed equally across society? Trust in the procedural fairness of an 
institution turns the focus onto the ways in which institutions wield their authority (Tyler, 2006a, 
2006b). Do the police and criminal courts treat people with dignity and respect? Do they make fair, 
transparent and accountable decisions?  
 
                                                 
2 The distinction between the role and the individual occupying the role should not be drawn too sharply, for the simple 
reason that people can only have encounters with police officers inhabiting their role – they cannot encounter the role 
without an individual embodying that role (representing the police as an institution). Public assessments of individual 
officers will flow into perceptions of the institution and the role. People will infer the moral basis of police power by the 
actions and values that are expressed by individual officers; the legitimacy of the role will thus be weakened by the 
actions of individuals who inhabit the role. Conversely, the authority emanating from the institution gives an individual 
officer the authority to prescribe authority and enforce laws. 
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When we trust a police officer we make a set of assumptions about the way he or she will behave in 
the future and how he or se currently behaves (Stoutland, 2001). The same is true for our sense of 
trust in police organizations: how do we think they behave now, and how do we think they will 
behave in the future? These assumptions are typically based on assessments of competence, 
predictability and motives (Luhmann 1979; Hardin 2006). Trust refers to people’s assumptions 
and beliefs about both intentions (e.g. do police officers want to be effective and fair?) and 
competence (e.g. are police officers able to be effective and fair?). Trust is about expectations about 
the future behaviour of actors (e.g. can I rely on the police to be effective and fair in the future) and 
expectations about current and ongoing behaviour of the same actors. Given that citizens have 
incomplete information (about whether the police are effectively tackling drug dealing and drug 
use, whether the police would treat them with citizen if they came into contact with an officer, and 
whether people often receive fair outcomes from the police), judgements of trustworthiness are a 
leap of faith. Risk is inherent in these assessments of trustworthiness; people cannot be sure that 
police officers are always effective and fair – they need to trust that police officers are. Trust is 
partly a leap of faith (Mollering 2006) (that police officers, for example, are effective and fair) and 
partly an assessment of current performance (are police officers, for example, effective and fair). 
 
Legitimacy of legal authorities 
For Weber the legitimacy of institutions is indicated by approval or sincere recognition of a norm, 
law or social arrangement by citizens within a system. On this account the legal system is legitimate 
when people see the system and its representatives as having the right to exist, to set appropriate 
standards of conduct, and to enforce these standards (Tyler & Huo, 2002). Here, legitimacy is partly 
a psychological state of consent, with authorisation involving a belief that the law and justice 
officials are to be complied and cooperated with, not due to threats of sanction in the event of non-
compliance, but because compliance and cooperation is the correct standard to maintain (Tyler, 
2006a, 2006b).  
 
But legitimacy is also a psychological state of normative justifiability of the possession of power 
(Jackson et al., 2011, 2012a, 2012b). Legitimacy is constituted in part by public assessments of the 
moral validity of institutional authority, based on judgements of the moral values expressed by 
actors and institutional practice. In the ESS R5 module (Jackson et al., 2011; European Social Survey 
2011, 2012; Hough et al., 2013a, 2013b, 2013c) we have conceptualised empirical legitimacy as 
having three sub-components – obligation to obey, legality and moral alignment – and we have 
constructed scales to measure each of these three components. This definition partly follows David 
Beetham (1991) in arguing that an authority has legitimacy when three preconditions are met:  
 
1. The ‘governed’ offer their willing consent to defer to the authority; and that, 
2. this consent is grounded  
a) on the authority’s conformity to standards of legality (acting according to the law) 
and  
b) on a degree of ‘moral alignment’ between power-holder and the governed, reflected 
in shared moral values.  
 
According to this definition, legitimacy is not simply signified by a positive duty to obey authority 
and a perception of that authority’s entitlement to command. The second and third pre-conditions 
of empirical legitimacy – legality and moral alignment – ensure that the obligation to obey is built 
on a combination of perceived lawfulness and moral validity of institutions of justice (for discussion 
of the meaning of legitimacy see Jackson et al., 2011; Bradford et al., 2013a, 2013b; Bottoms & 
Tankebe, 2012; Tankebe, 2013; Tyler & Jackson, 2013).  
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Legitimacy is here defined as an additive function of all three components. To say that the police are 
legitimate, for example, is to show that people within a given population feel a positive duty to obey 
the instructions of police officers, feel aligned with the moral values of the police as an institution 
(believe that the police have an appropriate sense of right and wrong), and believe that police 
officers act according to the rule of law. While some variation in individual – and indeed aggregate – 
‘scores’ on these variables is to be expected, significant shortfalls in any one set of opinions or 
propensities might lead us to infer that the institution involved suffers from some sort of legitimacy 
deficit.  
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3. PUBLIC TRUST AND INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY: A FOCUS ON SINGLE 
INDICATORS  
We next draw upon ESS R5 data to address national levels of public trust and perceived legitimacy 
of the police and criminal courts, using single measures of each core concept, i.e. we use answers to 
just one question fielded in the ESS to indicate national levels. The key constructs that we set out to 
measure in the module are set out in Box 1. In presenting selected results, we group countries into 
types, drawing on classifications used by Cavadino and Dignan (2006, 2013) and Seppi-Lappala 
(2011): Neo-liberal; Conservative corporatist; Social democratic corporatist; Southern European; 
Post communist; and Others (Israel).  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variations in trust and legitimacy across country 
Figure 1 shows (weighted) data using one of three items used to measure trust in police 
effectiveness. The question asked respondents how quickly the police would arrive if a violent 
crime occurred near their home, using an 11-point scale (we convert it to 0-1 in Figure 1).  We see 
limited variation across the 26 countries, with most ranging from 0.65 (Switzerland, with the 
highest mean) and 0.42 (Ukraine, with the lowest mean). Despite stereotypes of Scandinavian or 
northern European efficiency and southern or eastern European tardiness, it seems that Europeans 
have broadly equivalent beliefs and expectations about the ability of the police to turn up promptly 
when needed. 
 
Box 1    Some of the key concepts measured in the Trust in Justice module of 
ESS Round 5  
a. Trust in justice institutions 
i. Trust in police effectiveness 
ii. Trust in police procedural fairness 
iii. Trust in police distributive fairness 
iv. Trust in court effectiveness 
v. Trust in court procedural fairness 
vi. Trust in court distributive fairness 
b. Perceived legitimacy 
i. Consent to police authority (a sense of obligation to obey the police) 
ii. Consent to court authority (a sense of obligation to defer to the authority of the courts 
iii. Moral alignment with the police (endorsement of the moral right to power) 
iv. Moral alignment with the courts (endorsement of the moral right to power) 
v. The perceived legality of the police (operating under the rule of law) 
vi. The perceived legality of court officials (operating under the rule of law) 
c. Willingness to cooperate with the police and courts 
i. Preparedness to report crimes to the police 
ii. Preparedness to identify suspect to the police 
iii. Preparedness to act as a juror in court 
d. Compliance with the law: self-report measures of law-breaking over the past 5 years 
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Figure 1: Trust in police effectiveness, by country  
 
Question: “If a violent crime or house burglary were to occur near to where you live and the police 
were called, how slowly or quickly do you think they would arrive at the scene?”  (11-point scale 
running from ‘slow’ to ‘quick’. Converted in Figure 1 to 0 ‘slow’ to 1 ‘quick’) 
 
We see a little more country-level variation in levels of trust in court effectiveness (Figure 2). 
Respondents were asked how often they thought the courts in their country made mistakes that let 
guilty people go free. Lowest levels of trust are found in four post-communist countries (Bulgaria, 
Slovenia, Ukraine and Slovakia), two southern European countries (Spain and Greece) and one 
conservative corporatist country (France). Highest levels of trust are found in Denmark, Germany, 
Switzerland, Ireland and Hungary. 
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Figure 2: Trust in court effectiveness, by country  
 
Question: “Please tell me how often you think the courts make mistakes that let guilty people go 
free?” (11-point scale running from ‘never’ to ‘always’. Converted in Figure 2 to 0 ‘always’ to 1 
‘never’)  
 
Figure 3 shows responses to an item about the procedural fairness of the police. The ESS R5 module 
asked respondents how often the police treat people fairly, with responses ranging from ‘very 
often’ to ‘often’ to ‘not very often’ and  ‘not at all often’. Figure 3 plots the (weighted) proportion of 
people who say ‘often’ or ‘very often’ (as opposed to ‘not at all’ or ‘not very often’). Ukraine, the 
Russian Federation and Israel have the least positive views on how the police treat people, while 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Spain have the most positive views.  
 
In contrast to the picture in relation to trust in police effectiveness, we find here significant 
variation across the different groups of countries. Trust in the fairness of the police is highest in the 
social democratic Scandinavian countries, followed by the neo-liberal fringe of UK and Ireland and 
the conservative corporatist states. Trust in police fairness then declines as we move south and 
east, to what appears to be exceptionally low levels in the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, and 
Israel.  
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Figure 3: Trust in police procedural fairness, by country 
 
Question: “Based on what you have heard or your own experience how often would you say the 
police generally treat people in [country] with respect?  (4-point scale: ‘not at all often’, ‘not very 
often’, ‘often’ and ‘very often’. Converted in Figure to the proportion of people who said ‘often’ or 
‘very often’) 
  
Figure 4 shows responses to an item about procedural fairness, but this time of the criminal courts. 
The focus here moves from interpersonal decision-making (of the police, see Figure 3) to neutral 
decision-making (in the criminal courts, see Figure 4). The question asked respondents how often 
the courts make fair, impartial decisions based on the evidence made available to them, using an 
11-point scale (we convert it to 0-1). We find similar patterns to trust in court effectiveness (Figure 
2), albeit with slightly less variation. Lowest levels of trust are found in six post-communist 
countries (Bulgaria, Ukraine, Slovakia, Croatia, Russian Federation and Slovenia) and three 
southern European countries (Portugal, Spain and Greece). Highest levels of trust are found in 
Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, Ireland and Hungary. 
 
 
 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Ireland
United Kingdom
Switzerland
Germany
Belgium
Netherlands
France
Denmark
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Spain
Cyprus
Portugal
Greece
Estonia
Croatia
Slovenia
Poland
Hungary
Czech
Slovakia
Bulgaria
Russian Fed
Ukraine
Israel
N
e
o
-
li
b
e
ra
l
C
o
n
se
rv
a
ti
v
e
co
rp
o
ra
ti
st
S
o
c
ia
l
d
e
m
o
cr
a
ti
c
co
rp
o
ra
ti
st
S
o
u
th
e
rn
E
u
ro
p
e
a
n
P
o
st
 c
o
m
m
u
n
is
t
12 
 
  12
Figure 4: Trust in court procedural fairness, by country 
 
Question: “How often do you think the courts make fair, impartial decisions based on the evidence3 
made available to them?” (11-point scale running from ‘never’ to ‘always’. Converted to 0 to 1)  
 
As for trust in police distributive fairness, Figure 5 shows the (weighted) proportion of people who 
thought that when dealing with victims of crime, the police tend to treat rich and poor people 
equally. The countries least trusting of the police in this regard are Ukraine, Greece, Russian 
Federation, Slovakia and Israel. By contrast, Netherlands, Denmark, Finland and Estonia score 
relatively well. Variation here appears less closely correlated with country type, although, in 
general, perceptions of distributive fairness are worse in the southern European and post-
communist states and more favourable in the social democratic, conservative corporatist and neo-
liberal countries. 
 
                                                 
3 Evidence’ refers to the ‘testimony’ a witness gives verbally in court AND other materials presented to the court. 
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Figure 5  Trust in police distributive fairness, by country 
 
 
Question: “When victims report crimes, do you think the police treat rich people worse, poor people 
worse, or are rich and poor treated equally? Choose your answer from this card. (3 options: ‘Rich 
people treated worse’, ‘Poor people treated worse’, ‘Rich and poor treated equally’). Proportion of 
people saying ‘rich and poor treated equally’ shown. 
 
Figure 6 turns to trust in court distributive fairness. We see the (weighted) proportion of 
respondents who thought that people from different race or ethnic groups would have the same 
chance of being found guilty if they appeared in court, charged with an identical crime that they did 
not commit. Highest levels of trust are found in the neo-liberal countries (UK and Ireland), 
Netherlands, Germany Denmark, Estonia and Croatia. Lowest levels of trust are found in Greece, 
Portugal, Israel and Spain. 
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Figure 6 Trust in court distributive fairness, by country 
 
Question: “Now suppose two people from different race or ethnic groups each appear in court, 
charged with an identical crime they did not commit. Choose an answer from this card to show who 
you think would be more likely to be found guilty.” (3 options: ‘The person from a different race or 
ethnic group than most people is more likely to be found guilty’, ‘The person from the same race or 
ethnic group as most people is more likely to be found guilty’, and ‘They both have the same chance 
of being found guilty’). Proportion of people saying ‘they both have the same chance of being found 
guilty’ is shown. 
 
We now turn to legitimacy. As described above, the first dimension of legtimacy is consent and felt 
obligation. Consent refers to the agreement of the members of the public with decisions made by 
authorities. It “…precludes the use of external means of coercion; where force is used, authority 
itself has failed” (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012, p.114). Obligation involves a social, legal, or moral tie 
– it is a constraining power of a promise, contract, law, or sense of duty. Asking people whether it is 
their ‘duty’ to obey the police seems to capture a positive sense of obligation (something that one is 
expected or required to do out of moral or legal obligation) rather than a negative sense of 
obedience out of fear of reprisal or a sense of powerlessness. 
 
Figure 7 presents findings for a question measuring respondents’ sense of felt obligation to obey 
the police. Scores are highest in Denmark, Finland, Norway, Israel, Hungary, Sweden and Cyprus, 
and lowest in the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Slovenia.  
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Figure 7   Legitimacy: felt obligation to obey the police, by country 
 
Question: “To what extent is it your duty to do what the police tell you even if you don’t understand 
or agree with the reasons?  (11-point scale, running from ‘not at all’ to ‘completely’, converted to 0 
to 1) 
  
Figure 8 presents findings for a question measuring respondents’ sense of felt obligation to obey 
the law, specifically the (weighted) proportion of people saying that they agree strongly or agree 
with the sentiment that ‘all laws should be strictly obeyed.’ At first glance the results are puzzling. 
Compared to felt obligation to obey the police, a different picture emerges. Specifically, the 
countries with highest levels of felt obligation are Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Russian Federation and 
Ukraine, while the countries with the lowest levels of felt obligation are Sweden, Denmark, 
Germany and Norway. Perhaps the answer lies in the wording of the sentiment: ‘all laws should be 
strictly obeyed’ (emphasis added). This may tap into a certain authoritarian worldview, as well as 
felt obligation of a more positive type.  
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Figure 8   Legitimacy: felt obligation to obey the law, by country 
 
Question: “All laws should be strictly obeyed” (Five point scale, running from ‘agree strongly to 
‘disagree strongly’.) Proportion who ‘agree strongly' or ‘agree’ is shown. 
 
The first dimension of legtiimacy is consent and felt obligation. Consent refers to the agreement of 
the members of the public with decisions made by authorities. It “…precludes the use of external 
means of coercion; where force is used, authority itself has failed” (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012, 
p.114). Obligation involves a social, legal, or moral tie – it is a constraining power of a promise, 
contract, law, or sense of duty. Asking people whether it is their ‘duty’ to obey the police seems to 
capture a positive sense of obligation (something that one is expected or required to do out of 
moral or legal obligation) rather than a negative sense of obedience out of fear of reprisal or a sense 
of powerlessness. 
 
The second dimension of police legitimacy is moral alignment. For the policed to regard power-
holders as having legitimate authority, they must to a certain extent believe that its power is 
normatively justified. Moral alignment can be seen as a constitutive element of legitimacy because 
it embodies a sense of normative justifiability of power and authority in the eyes of the citizens, in 
that institutions (specifically, actors working for institutions) act in ways that accord with – or are 
aligned with – public views about what is right or wrong. ‘Alignment’ is generated when there is 
accordance between the ethics of institutions and the ethics of citizens. 
 
When one believes that police officers act in accordance with an appropriate sense of right and 
wrong, this constitutes a conferred moral validity to their possession of power. Recent UK research 
(Jackson et al., 2012a, 2012b) has linked procedural justice to the public sense that police officers 
have the appropriate moral values. When officers wield their power in fair and just ways, this 
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seems to imbue them with a sense of appropriate moral purpose and values in the eyes of citizens, 
generating and sustaining the moral validity of their power and authority. Operating within an 
appropriate ethical and normative framework seems to validate possession of power in the eyes of 
citizens (Bradford et al., 2013a, 2013b; Jackson et al, 2013).   
 
We measured the moral basis of police authority using questions such as ‘The police generally have 
the same sense of right and wrong as I do’. These items are assumed to indicate whether or not 
people believe the police are policing according to an appropriate a shared vision of appropriate 
social order, and thus have a sense of moral validity to their possessed power. 
 
Figure 9 shows (weighted) levels of agreement with the statement ‘The police have the same sense 
of right and wrong as I do’. We see that moral alignment is highest in Denmark, France, Sweden and 
Norway, and lowest in Estonia, Cyprus, Poland and Russian Federation.  The pattern here is broadly 
similar to that in relation to felt obligation, and citizens of northern and western European 
countries generally felt more morally aligned with their police, while scores on this measure were 
generally lower in the post-communist countries. 
 
Figure 9  Legitimacy: moral alignment with the police, by country 
 
Question: “The police generally have the same sense of right and wrong as I do.” (Five point scale, 
running from completely agree to ‘completely disagree’.). Proportion who ‘agree strongly' or ‘agree’ 
is shown. 
 
Figure 10 turns to the courts, showing levels of disagreement with the statement ‘Courts generally 
protect the interests of the rich and powerful above those of ordinary people.’ Note that there is 
some conceptual overlap with distributive justice. For the present purpose, however, we treat 
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disagreement to this statement as a sense of shared moral values (assuming that the vast majority of 
ESS respondents are not the rich and powerful) and a belief that the courts operate according to an 
appropriate sense of right and wrong. We see quite a lot of variation. Moral alignment with the 
courts is highest in Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden and Finland. Moral alignment with the 
courts is lowest in Ukraine, Bulgaria, Portugal, Slovakia and Russian Federation. 
 
Figure 10  Legitimacy: moral alignment with the criminal courts, by country 
 
Question: “Courts generally protect the interests of the rich and powerful above those of ordinary 
people.” (Five point scale, running from completely agree to ‘completely disagree’.). Proportion who 
‘disagree strongly' or ‘disagree’ is shown.  
 
The final sub-component of police legitimacy is the perceived legality of their actions. For the police 
to have the right to rule, they must not abuse their entrusted power; they must act according to the 
rule of law. Figure 11 shows how often people think the police take bribes. We see that police bribe-
taking is seen to be lowest in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, and highest in the Ukraine, 
the Russian Federation, Bulgaria and Slovakia. There is again significant variation by country type. 
Perceptions of police corruption were most favourable in the social democratic Scandinavian states 
and least favourable in the Southern European and post-communist countries. 
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Figure 11  perceived legality of police action, by country 
 
Question: “How often would you say that the police in [country] take bribes? (11-point scale where 
0 is ‘never’ and 10 is ‘always’, converted to 0 to 1.)  
 
Figure 12 shows how often people think judges take bribes. As with the police, we see that judge 
bribe-taking is seen to be lowest in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, and highest in the 
Ukraine, Croatia, and Poland. As with the police, perceptions of court corruption were most 
favourable in the social democratic Scandinavian states and least favourable in the Southern 
European and post-communist countries. 
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Figure 12  perceived legality of criminal court action, by country 
 
Question: “How often would you say that the judges in [country] take bribes? (11-point scale where 
0 is ‘never’ and 10 is ‘always’, converted to 0 to 1.)  
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4. PUBLIC TRUST AND INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY: A FOCUS ON MULTIPLE 
INDICATORS 
In section 4 we move beyond single indicators. In the case of trust in the police and perceptions of 
police legitimacy, multiple indicators were fielded to measure most concepts, and we assess here 
whether the scales for the appropriate constructs operate comparably in the different countries. 
We also examine the effect of a lack of measurement equivalence on national estimates.  
 
When multiple items are used to represent abstract and complex constructs such as attitudes and 
values, they are often analysed using the statistical method of latent variable modeling. This 
technique represents responses to the items as measurements of unobserved (latent) constructs. 
The most widely used latent variable models are linear factor analysis models and their extensions. 
One of the key methodological challenges in international surveys is the question of cross-national 
equivalence of measurement. Essentially the issue is, does a survey question measure the same 
concept and in the same way in all countries? If it does not, respondents from different countries 
can give different expected responses even if they have the same level of the concept of interest.  
 
Critically, lack of equivalence can compromise any substantive cross-national comparisons. It is 
quite plausible in surveys which cover many countries, perhaps because of cultural differences in 
how a question is understood, or variations in questionnaire translation. It has even been argued 
that measurements should be assumed non-equivalent by default (see e.g. Kohn 1987), in which 
case equivalence should always be demonstrated first of all. 
 
Consider the three items that constitute each scale for trust in police effectiveness, trust in police 
procedural fairness, felt obligation to obey the police, and moral alignment with the police.  
 
Three items for police effectiveness (eff1, eff2, eff3) 
• D12     Based on what you have heard or your own experience how successful do you think the police 
are at preventing crimes in [country] where violence is used or threatened? Choose your answer 
from this card, where 0 is extremely unsuccessful and 10 is extremely successful. 
 
• D13     And how successful do you think the police are at catching people who commit house 
burglaries in [country]? Choose your answer from this card, where 0 is extremely unsuccessful and 
10 is extremely successful. 
 
• D14     If a violent crime were to occur near to where you live and the police were called, how slowly 
or quickly do you think they would arrive at the scene? Choose your answer from this card, where 0 
is extremely slowly and 10 is extremely quickly. [separate code for ‘violent crimes never occur near 
to where I live’ 
 
Three items for police procedural fairness (pj1, pj2, pj3) 
Next, some questions about when the police deal with crimes like house burglary and physical 
assault.  
  
• D15     Based on what you have heard or your own experience how often would you say the  police 
generally treat people in [country] with respect …’not at all often’ ‘not very often’, ‘often’ or ‘very 
often’? 
 
• D16     About how often would you say that the police make fair, impartial decisions in the cases they 
deal with? Would you say…’not at all often’ ‘not very often’, ‘often’ or ‘very often’? 
 
22 
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• D17     And when dealing with people in [country], how often would you say the police generally 
explain their decisions and actions when asked to do so? Would you say…’not at all often’ ‘not very 
often’, ‘often’, ‘very often’, or ‘no one ever asks the police to explain their decisions and actions’? 
  
Felt obligation to obey the police (obey1, obey2, obey3) 
Next, some questions about your duty towards the police in [country]. Use this card where 0 is not 
at all your duty and 10 is completely your duty. To what extent is it your duty to… 
 
 
Moral alignment with the police (moralid1, moralid2 & moralid3) 
Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements about the police in [country]. ‘Agree strongly’, ‘agree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, 
‘disagree’, or ‘disagree strongly’.  
        
• D21  The police generally have the same sense of right and wrong as I do. 
 
• D22  The police stand up for values that are important to people like me.  
 
• D23  I generally support how the police usually act. 
 
We conduct a series of sensitivity analyses, which involves comparing estimated factor means given 
different assumptions about measurement equivalence. Each scale is analysed using standard 
multi-group factor analysis. As part of this, special response options which do not fit into the 
ordering of the other options are treated as missing data (as are of course actual missing 
responses); such options occur for eff3 and pj3. For each scale, we fit 7 models: one full equivalence 
model, 3 models where one item is non-equivalent across the countries, and 3 models where two 
items are non-equivalent. Note that two non-equivalent items are here the maximum possible, 
because a model with all three items non-equivalent does not allow the distributions (means and 
variances) of the latent variables to be compared between countries. When an item is equivalent, all 
of its measurement parameters (loading, intercept and error variance) are fixed to be equal across 
countries; when it is non-equivalent, all of them are allowed to be different across the countries.   
 
The analysis is done in R, using the lavaan package. The results (see appendix) show standard 
goodness of fit statistics for all of the models for each scale, and likelihood ratio tests between the 
models. In each case, models which free 2 out of 3 items are favoured in terms of goodness of fit. 
There is thus little evidence for measurement equivalence in each of the four scales. 
 
A question to address is what effect a lack of measurement equivalence has on the task of this 
article, namely estimating levels of trust and legitimacy in the 26 countries. Below we present three 
plots for each scale: one with estimated factor means (with 95% confidence intervals) from the 
equivalence model; one with means from the equivalence model and the three models with one 
item non-equivalent; and one plot with the means from all of the 7 models. In the latter, the models 
with one item non-equivalent are shown with solid thin lines, and models with two non-equivalent 
items with dashed thin lines. In each plot, the countries are ordered in decreasing order of 
estimated mean from the equivalence model for that construct.     
 
• D18 …back the decisions made by the police even when you disagree with them? 
 
• D19 …do what the police tell you even if you don’t understand or agree with the reasons? 
 
• D20 … do what the police tell you to do, even if you don’t like how they treat you? 
23 
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The reference line in each plot is the weighted average of the estimated country means from the 
equivalence model, weighted by ESS population size. It thus represents, roughly, the estimated 
average for the combined population of these 26 countries.  
 
Police effectiveness 
Figure 13 shows estimated levels of trust in police effectiveness in each of the 26 countries (with 
95% confidence intervals) when one assumes that the scales work the same in each context. This 
means that the factor loadings and intercepts are constrained to be equal. 
 
Figure 13  trust in police effectiveness, measurement equivalence assumed 
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Figure 14 shows the means from the equivalence model but also plots means from the three models 
with one item non-equivalent. We can see that the estimates move around a small to moderate 
amount. 
 
Figure 14  trust in police effectiveness, adding one item non-equivalence  
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Figure 15 adds the estimated means from the last three models, where the models with two non-
equivalent items are indicated with dashed thin lines. We see that the models with two non-
equivalent items produce quite a lot of variation in the estimated means. Say, for example, one is 
interested in comparing the Finland and Switzerland. Depending on the specific method one uses, 
Finland has higher levels of trust than Switzerland, or it has very similar levels, or Switzerland has 
higher levels of trust than Finland. 
 
Figure 15  trust in police effectiveness, adding two item non-equivalence  
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Police procedural justice 
Figure 16 shows estimated levels of trust in police procedural fairness in each of the 26 countries 
(with 95% confidence intervals) when one assumes that the scales work the same in each context.  
 
Figure 16  trust in police procedural justice, measurement equivalence assumed 
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Figure 17 shows the means from the equivalence model but also plots means from the three models 
with one item non-equivalent. We can see that the estimates move around a small amount. 
 
Figure 17  trust in police procedural justice, adding one item non-equivalence  
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Figure 18 adds the estimated means from the last three models, where the models with two non-
equivalent items are indicated with dashed thin lines. We see that the models with two non-
equivalent items produce a fair amount of variation in the estimated means (although less than 
trust in police effectiveness). 
 
Figure 18  trust in police procedural justice, adding two item non-equivalence  
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Obligation to obey the police 
Figure 19 shows estimated levels of felt obligation to obey the police in each of the 26 countries 
(with 95% confidence intervals) when one assumes that the scales work the same in each context.  
 
Figure 19  obligation to obey the police, measurement equivalence assumed 
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Figure 20 shows the means from the equivalence model but also plots means from the three models 
with one item non-equivalent. We can see that the estimates move around a small amount. 
 
Figure 20  obligation to obey the police, adding one item non-equivalence  
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Figure 21 adds the estimated means from the last three models, where the models with two non-
equivalent items are indicated with dashed thin lines. We see that the models with two non-
equivalent items produce a fair amount of variation in the estimated means. Say, for example, one is 
interested in comparing the Norway and Hungary. Depending on the specific method one uses, 
Norway has higher levels of trust than Hungary, or it has very similar levels, or Hungary has higher 
levels of trust than Norway 
 
Figure 21  obligation to obey the police, adding two item non-equivalence  
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Moral alignment with the police  
Figure 22 shows estimated levels of moral alignment with the police (the belief that police officers 
share their sense of right and wrong) in each of the 26 countries (with 95% confidence intervals) 
when one assumes that the scales work the same in each context.  
 
Figure 22  moral alignment with the police, measurement equivalence assumed 
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Figure 23 shows the means from the equivalence model but also plots means from the three models 
with one item non-equivalent. We can see that the estimates move around a small amount. 
 
Figure 23  moral alignment with the police, adding one item non-equivalence  
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Figure 24 adds the estimated means from the last three models, where the models with two non-
equivalent items are indicated with dashed thin lines. We see that the models with two non-
equivalent items produce quite a lot of variation in the estimated means. Say, for example, one is 
interested in comparing the Ukraine and Russian Federation. Depending on the specific method one 
uses, Ukraine has higher levels of trust than Russian Federation, or it has very similar levels, or 
Russian Federation has higher levels of trust than Ukraine. 
 
Figure 24  moral alignment with the police, adding two item non-equivalence  
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5. SUMMARY AND NEXT STEPS  
In this FIDUCIA deliverable to the European Commission we have outlined the importance of social 
indicators of trust and legitimacy in the domain of criminal justice. We have defined and measured 
trust and legitimacy, and we have provided levels of trust and legitimacy in 26 countries using two 
methods. The first method draws upon a single measure of each construct, weighted to form 
national estimates using Round 5 European Social Survey (ESS) data. The second uses multiple 
indicators of certain constructs. Because the data are cross-national, and because the scales can 
work differently in different contexts, we assessed the comparability of the scales and the effect of 
any lack of direct comparability on national estimates. 
 
We have shown levels of trust and legitimacy in 26 countries. Reporting findings using a single 
measure of each construct we found that levels of trust tended to be lowest in Greece, Portugal, 
Ukraine, Bulgaria and Russian Federation, and highest in Switzerland, Finland, Denmark and 
Netherlands. Levels of legitimacy tended to be lowest in Ukraine and Russian Federation, and 
highest in Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway. 
 
Second, some of the constructs are measured using scales in R5 ESS, and we found a lack of 
measurement equivalence. We also found that a lack of equivalence potentially compromises any 
substantive cross-national comparisons. The next step is use some kind of model averaging to 
estimate national levels, weighting different estimates according to measurement equivalence 
model fit. 
 
Work Package 11 has two other tasks. Task 11.2 turns to the explanation of levels of trust and 
legitimacy across Europe. This task will address a wealth of individual and national/contextual 
factors will may help explain why some individuals find the police (for example) trustworthy while 
other individuals do not, and why the police (for example) are seen by citizens to be legitimate in 
some countries than in other countries. Task 11.2 will also add measures of normative legitimacy, 
e.g. national level measures of corruption, accountability and transparency. 
 
Furthermore, Task 11.3 examines whether public compliance with the law regarding everyday-
crimes (such as buying stolen goods) and intentions to cooperate with the police and courts are 
linked to trust and legitimacy. We will explore two models of crime-crime policy. The first is based 
on an instrumental model of public behaviour. Here, people’s reasons for law-breaking and 
cooperating with legal authorities are based on self-interested calculation – that is, driven by “what 
is in it for me?” If this model holds, then it follows that compliance and cooperation will be secured 
by the presence of formal or informal mechanisms of social control and the existence of severe 
sanctions for wrong-doers. The second model is based on normative motivations. It is based upon 
the belief that it is right to obey the law – simply because it is the law – and it is right to help justice 
systems in the fight against crime. Legal legitimacy is the belief that laws are personally binding, 
that one has a moral obligation to abide by the law. When people believe that rules are binding, 
they feel a duty to obey the rules put in place by authorities, regardless of the morality of a given act 
or the unfamiliar nature of the offence.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Police effectiveness 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LCAT output 
Log-likelihood and information criteria: 
      Model Observations Parameters        LL      AIC      BIC AICmin BICmin       
1    eff.eq        49972         59 -292441.1 585000.1 585520.5      0      0     1 
2  eff.eff1        49972        134 -290960.3 582188.5 583370.3      0      0     2 
3  eff.eff2        49972        134 -290707.6 581683.2 582865.0      0      0     3 
4  eff.eff3        49972        134 -291302.2 582872.3 584054.1      0      0     4 
5 eff.eff12        49972        209 -289946.9 580311.7 582154.9      0      0     5 
6 eff.eff13        49972        209 -289746.7 579911.3 581754.5      0      0     6 
7 eff.eff23        49972        209 -289634.4 579686.7 581529.9      1      1     7 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Other fit statistics for linear factor analysis: 
      Model     Chi2  df P-value   CFI   TLI RMSEA RMSEA95l RMSEA95u       
1    eff.eq 5750.212 175       0 0.866 0.940 0.129    0.126    0.132     1 
2  eff.eff1 2788.603 100       0 0.935 0.950 0.118    0.115    0.122     2 
3  eff.eff2 2283.275 100       0 0.948 0.959 0.107    0.103    0.110     3 
4  eff.eff3 3472.385 100       0 0.919 0.937 0.132    0.129    0.136     4 
5 eff.eff12  761.803  25       0 0.982 0.945 0.124    0.116    0.131     5 
6 eff.eff13  361.409  25       0 0.992 0.975 0.084    0.076    0.091     6 
7 eff.eff23  136.818  25       0 0.997 0.992 0.048    0.041    0.056     7 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Likelihood ratio tests: 
        H0        H1  LR.test     df P.value 
1   eff.eq  eff.eff1 2961.610 75.000 <0.0005 
2   eff.eq  eff.eff2 3466.938 75.000 <0.0005 
3   eff.eq  eff.eff3 2277.828 75.000 <0.0005 
4 eff.eff2 eff.eff12 1521.472 75.000 <0.0005 
5 eff.eff1 eff.eff13 2427.194 75.000 <0.0005 
6 eff.eff2 eff.eff23 2146.456 75.000 <0.0005 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Police procedural justice 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
LCAT output 
Log-likelihood and information criteria: 
    Model Observations Parameters        LL      AIC      BIC AICmin BICmin       
1   pj.eq        48953         59 -119522.0 239162.0 239681.1      0      0     1 
2  pj.pj1        48953        134 -118955.8 238179.7 239358.7      0      0     2 
3  pj.pj2        48953        134 -119038.2 238344.4 239523.4      0      0     3 
4  pj.pj3        48953        134 -118859.4 237986.9 239165.9      0      0     4 
5 pj.pj12        48953        209 -118428.2 237274.3 239113.2      0      0     5 
6 pj.pj13        48953        209 -118377.4 237172.7 239011.7      1      1     6 
7 pj.pj23        48953        209 -118396.8 237211.5 239050.5      0      0     7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Other fit statistics for linear factor analysis: 
    Model     Chi2  df P-value   CFI   TLI RMSEA RMSEA95l RMSEA95u       
1   pj.eq 2449.624 175       0 0.936 0.972 0.083    0.080    0.086     1 
2  pj.pj1 1317.282 100       0 0.966 0.973 0.080    0.077    0.084     2 
3  pj.pj2 1481.984 100       0 0.961 0.970 0.086    0.082    0.090     3 
4  pj.pj3 1124.470 100       0 0.971 0.978 0.074    0.070    0.078     4 
5 pj.pj12  261.896  25       0 0.993 0.979 0.071    0.063    0.079     5 
6 pj.pj13  160.338  25       0 0.996 0.988 0.054    0.046    0.062     6 
7 pj.pj23  199.138  25       0 0.995 0.985 0.061    0.053    0.069     7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood ratio tests: 
      H0      H1  LR.test     df P.value 
1  pj.eq  pj.pj1 1132.342 75.000 <0.0005 
2  pj.eq  pj.pj2  967.640 75.000 <0.0005 
3  pj.eq  pj.pj3 1325.154 75.000 <0.0005 
4 pj.pj2 pj.pj12 1220.088 75.000 <0.0005 
5 pj.pj1 pj.pj13 1156.946 75.000 <0.0005 
6 pj.pj2 pj.pj23 1282.848 75.000 <0.0005 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Obligation to obey the police 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
LCAT output 
Log-likelihood and information criteria: 
        Model Observations Parameters        LL      AIC      BIC AICmin BICmin       
1     obey.eq        49501         59 -313977.8 628073.7 628593.5      0      0     1 
2  obey.obey1        49501        134 -310472.6 621213.2 622393.7      0      0     2 
3  obey.obey2        49501        134 -313146.3 626560.6 627741.1      0      0     3 
4  obey.obey3        49501        134 -312935.3 626138.7 627319.2      0      0     4 
5 obey.obey12        49501        209 -309683.8 619785.5 621626.8      0      0     5 
6 obey.obey13        49501        209 -309621.6 619661.1 621502.4      1      1     6 
7 obey.obey23        49501        209 -310960.1 622338.1 624179.3      0      0     7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Other fit statistics for linear factor analysis: 
        Model     Chi2  df P-value   CFI   TLI RMSEA RMSEA95l RMSEA95u       
1     obey.eq 8872.600 175       0 0.902 0.956 0.162    0.159    0.164     1 
2  obey.obey1 1862.096 100       0 0.980 0.984 0.096    0.092    0.100     2 
3  obey.obey2 7209.508 100       0 0.920 0.937 0.193    0.189    0.197     3 
4  obey.obey3 6787.588 100       0 0.924 0.941 0.187    0.184    0.191     4 
5 obey.obey12  284.450  25       0 0.997 0.991 0.074    0.066    0.082     5 
6 obey.obey13  160.060  25       0 0.998 0.995 0.053    0.046    0.061     6 
7 obey.obey23 2837.018  25       0 0.968 0.901 0.243    0.236    0.251     7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood ratio tests: 
          H0          H1  LR.test     df P.value 
1    obey.eq  obey.obey1 7010.504 75.000 <0.0005 
2    obey.eq  obey.obey2 1663.092 75.000 <0.0005 
3    obey.eq  obey.obey3 2085.010 75.000 <0.0005 
4 obey.obey2 obey.obey12 6925.058 75.000 <0.0005 
5 obey.obey1 obey.obey13 1702.036 75.000 <0.0005 
6 obey.obey2 obey.obey23 4372.490 75.000 <0.0005 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
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Moral alignment with the police  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
LCAT output 
Log-likelihood and information criteria: 
              Model Observations Parameters        LL      AIC      BIC AICmin BICmin       
1        moralid.eq        49969         59 -164041.3 328200.5 328720.8      0      0     1 
2  moralid.moralid1        49969        134 -163370.6 327009.1 328190.9      0      0     2 
3  moralid.moralid2        49969        134 -162771.1 325810.2 326992.0      0      0     3 
4  moralid.moralid3        49969        134 -162114.5 324497.1 325678.8      0      0     4 
5 moralid.moralid12        49969        209 -161779.9 323977.8 325821.0      0      0     5 
6 moralid.moralid13        49969        209 -161444.1 323306.2 325149.4      1      1     6 
7 moralid.moralid23        49969        209 -161451.1 323320.1 325163.3      0      0     7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Other fit statistics for linear factor analysis: 
              Model     Chi2  df P-value   CFI   TLI RMSEA RMSEA95l RMSEA95u       
1        moralid.eq 5420.236 175       0 0.896 0.954 0.125    0.122    0.128     1 
2  moralid.moralid1 4078.826 100       0 0.921 0.939 0.144    0.140    0.148     2 
3  moralid.moralid2 2879.937 100       0 0.945 0.957 0.120    0.117    0.124     3 
4  moralid.moralid3 1566.790 100       0 0.971 0.977 0.087    0.084    0.091     4 
5 moralid.moralid12  897.490  25       0 0.983 0.946 0.135    0.127    0.142     5 
6 moralid.moralid13  225.912  25       0 0.996 0.988 0.065    0.057    0.073     6 
7 moralid.moralid23  239.832  25       0 0.996 0.987 0.067    0.059    0.075     7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood ratio tests: 
                H0                H1  LR.test     df P.value 
1       moralid.eq  moralid.moralid1 1341.410 75.000 <0.0005 
2       moralid.eq  moralid.moralid2 2540.300 75.000 <0.0005 
3       moralid.eq  moralid.moralid3 3853.446 75.000 <0.0005 
4 moralid.moralid2 moralid.moralid12 1982.448 75.000 <0.0005 
5 moralid.moralid1 moralid.moralid13 3852.914 75.000 <0.0005 
6 moralid.moralid2 moralid.moralid23 2640.106 75.000 <0.0005 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
